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Rush: Evidence

EVIDENCE
STATE v. ACORD, 336 S.E.2d 741 (W. Va. 1985).
CriminalProcedure-Evidence
The appellant was found guilty of sexual assault. The evidence against him
included testimony by persons who were with him shortly before and after the
assault and testimony that he had tried to sell a ring similar to the one stolen
at the time of the assault. The stolen ring was never recovered, but the victim
had a duplicate made which was entered into evidence over the defense counsel's
objection. A witness identified the duplicate as being similar to the one the appellant tried to sell. At one point during the trial, a state witness remarked that
he had passed a polygraph test. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The motion
was denied, but the court did instruct the jury to disregard the remark.
On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed the following issues: (1) Whether a duplicate of a stolen item that has not been recovered
may be entered as evidence for purposes of identification by a witness, and (2)
whether the trial court erred in refusing the appellant's motion for a mistrial when
the witness remarked that he had passed a polygraph test.
The court held that when an accurate physical replica of an unavailable object
is helpful in clarifying a witness's testimony, that replica may be introduced into
evidence at the trial court's discretion. The court also held that the trial court
did not err in refusing the appellant's motion for a mistrial since the remark was
not so prejudicial as to require a mistrial and since the remark was withdrawn
and the jury instructed to disregard it.
STATE v. BERRY, 342 S.E.2d 259 (W. Va. 1986).
Criminal Procedure-Evidence
The appellant was accused of murdering his wife. Evidence was offered to
show that the appellant had threatened to kill his wife on other occasions at least
one year before she died. The state also introduced evidence that the appellant
had falsely reported his wife's death as a suicide, and the appellant admitted to
making the false statements. The prosecution cross-examined the appellant on the
religious significance of the alleged suicide in an attempt to show that suicide
was inconsistent with the wife's religious beliefs. Defense counsel's objection was
overruled, but the appellant said he did not understand the question, and the
prosecution did not inquire any further. The court read the state's instruction on
the standard of proof which stated that "proof beyond a reasonable doubt.. .must
be proof of such convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate
to rely and act upon it." The appellant was convicted of murder in the second
degree.
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On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed the following issues: (1) Whether the defendant's previous threats against his wife were
too remote in time to be admissible, (2) whether the false statements by the
appellant were admissible, (3) whether the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to cross-examine on the issue of the wife's religious beliefs, and (4) whether
the trial court erred in reading the state's instruction on "reasonable doubt."
The court held: (1) In a murder prosecution, threats by the defendant against
the life of the deceased are admissible; remoteness in time of the statements goes
to the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility; therefore, the appellant's
previous threats were admissible; (2) the false statements are admissible for purposes of impeachment and as evidence of the appellant's credibility since he was
the only witness to testify to the events of the night of the wife's death; (3) the
trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution to cross-examine on the issue
of the wife's religious beliefs since the state was entitled to present evidence to
rebut the appellant's assertion that his wife was trying to commit suicide and
there was no prejudice to the appellant since he did not answer the question; and
(4) the trial court gave the correct instruction on reasonable doubt.
STATE v. DOLIN, 347 S.E.2d 208 (W. Va. 1986).
Criminal Procedure-Evidence
The defendant was charged with sexual assault and committing incest with
his daughter. The time period for the charge of sexual assault against someone
under the age of eleven was limited to August 1976 to August 1978 and was
determined by the date the relevant statute went into effect and the daughter's
eleventh birthday. The evidence consisted of the daughter's uncorroborated testimony, and she could not state any specific offenses within the relevant time
period. The trial court permitted the daughter to testify as to sexual offenses
committed outside the relevant time period. The trial court conducted an in camera
hearing to determine the admissability of the collateral offense testimony, but the
offenses and the possible applicable exceptions were merely discussed in general
terms, and the evidence was admitted on the issue of intent. The jury instructions
informed the jury that some of the collateral offenses could be considered only
in relation to the following exceptions: motive, intent, absence of mistake or
accident, a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more
crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the others,
and the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial.
The jury convicted the defendant of sexual assault but acquitted him of incest.
On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed the following issues: (1) Whether the specific collateral offenses evidence must be discussed in detail at the in camera hearing before being admitted; (2) whether evidence
of collateral sexual offenses can be admitted on the issue of intent in a prosecution
for incest and sexual assault of someone under the age of eleven; (3) whether
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evidence of collateral sexual offenses can be admitted to show an "improper or
lustful disposition of the defendant toward the victim"; and (4) whether the trial
court is required to limit the consideration of all the collateral crimes to the
exceptions.
The court held: (1) The specific collateral offenses must be discussed in detail
at the in-camera hearing. Without specific information about the collateral offenses, the court cannot weigh the similarities and differences between the collateral offenses and the present offense. Such information is necessary in
determining whether the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect of the
evidence. (2) The evidence may not be admitted on the issue of intent because
intent is not an element of either incest or sexual assault of someone under the
age of eleven as stated in West Virginia Code section 61-8-12. (3) The "improper
or lustful disposition of the defendant" is not one of the exceptions to the general
rule that evidence of collateral offenses is inadmissable, and the evidence may
not be admitted to show such a disposition. (4) The trial court is required to
limit consideration of all collateral offenses to those exceptions since failure to
limit a collateral offense would leave the jury free to consider that offense as
evidence of the charged offense.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice McHugh argued that evidence of collateral
sexual offenses should be admissible to show the defendant's "improper or lustful
disposition" toward the victim.
STATE v. HAGER, 342 S.E.2d 281 (W. Va. 1986).
Criminal Procedure-Evidence
The defendant was accused of murder of a police officer and relied on a selfdefense argument. At trial, the presecution offered a statement made by the
defendant at the time of the arrest that rebutted this argument. The prosecution
had not made this statement available to the defendant prior to trial despite the
defendant's discovery request. The prosecution claimed that it did not know of
the statement until trial. In an attempt to support his claim of self-defense, the
defendant offered testimony from two men who had been violently and unjustifiably arrested by the officer one week before his death. The trial court excluded
this testimony, and the jury found the defendant guilty.
On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed the following issues: (1) Whether Rule 16(a)(1)(A) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal
Procedure sanctions the prosecution's use of statements that are discovered during
trial when such statements have been disclosed pursuant to the defendant's pretrial
request for disclosure; (2) whether the defendant's preparation for trial was prejudiced by the newly discovered evidence; and (3) whether the trial court erred in
excluding the defendant's evidence of the officer's violent nature.
The court held: (1) The prosecution may use evidence that it discovers during
trial if it discloses the evidence to the defense as soon as reasonably possible and
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if the use of the evidence would not unduly prejudice the defendant's preparation
for trial; (2) the defendant's preparation for trial was prejudiced since his counsel
would probably have tried the case differently had he known of the testimony
rebutting the self-defense argument; and (3) the trial court did not err in excluding
the evidence of the officer's violent nature since the defendant did not know of
the violent arrests. An accused who relies on a self-defense argument may not
present proof of specific acts of violence committed by the deceased upon third
persons unless the accused had an opportunity to know of these acts.
STATE v. HATALA, 345 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1986).
Criminal Procedure-Evidence
In a prosecution for grand larceny, the defendant's counsel failed to object
to hearsay testimony concerning the value of the stolen goods. The declarant of
the hearsay testimony was present and willing to testify if needed. In its closing
remarks, the prosecution stated that the defense counsel would "give you all kinds
of smoke screens," and no objection was made to the statement. The defendant
was convicted.
On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed the following issues: (1) Whether the defense counsel's failure to object to the hearsay
testimony constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, and (2) whether the prosecutor's improper statement constituted plain error.
Relying on prior case law, the court declared: "Where a counsel's performance, attacked as ineffective, arises from occurrences involving strategy, tactics,
and arguable courses of action, his conduct will be deemed effectively assistive
of his client's interests, unless no reasonably qualified defense attorney would
have so acted in the defense of an accused." The court held: (1) The defense
counsel's failure to object to the hearsay testimony prevented testimony by another
state's witness, and as a tactical or strategic decision it is deemed effective assistance; and (2) the prosecutor's statement was not such an obvious error that
the plain error doctrine need be invoked. The doctrine will be used only where
a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.
STATE v. SEXTON, 346 S.E.2d 745 (W. Va. 1985).
Criminal Procedure-Evidence
The defendant was convicted of grand larceny on evidence which consisted
of his fingerprints taken from a watch case where a watch had been stolen, testimony that he had tried to sell a watch around the time of the robbery, and
testimony concerning.his access to the room from which the goods were stolen
and his lack of opportunity to touch the watch case on a purely innocent occasion.
At trial the defendant denied taking any of the several items missing from the
room.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol89/iss2/19

4

Rush: Evidence
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed the following issues: (1) Whether the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict,
and (2) whether the defendant was entitled to an instruction on the lesser offense
of petit larceny since his fingerprints appeared on only the watch case and since
the stolen watch was valued at less than $200.
The court held; (1) Fingerprint evidence is circumstantial and will not support
a guilty verdict when it is the only evidence linking the defendant to the crime;
however, where additional evidence supports the verdict, as in this case, the court
will not interfere; and (2) where there is no evidentiary dispute or insufficiency
on the elements of the greater offense which are different from the elements of
the lesser included offense, the defendant is not entitled to a lesser included offense
instruction.
STATE v. SIMMONS, 337 S.E.2d 314 (W. Va. 1985).
CriminalProcedure-Evidence
The defendant was convicted of sexual abuse against his daughter. Evidence
was admitted at trial showing the defendant had prior sexual relations with his
daughter other than those for which he had been charged.
On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed whether
evidence of sexual contact with the victim at places and times other than the place
and time of the charged act was admissable.
The court held that the evidence was inadmissible under the common law
rule that in a criminal prosecution, proof which shows or tends to show that the
accused is guilty of the commission of other crimes and offenses at other times,
even though they are of the same nature as the one charged, is incompetent and
inadmissible for the purpose of showing the commission of the particular crime
charged, unless such other offenses are an element of or are legally connected
with the offense for which the accused is on trial.
STATE v. THOMPSON, 342 S.E.2d 268 (W. Va. 1986).
Criminal Procedure-Evidence
With his permission, the police gave an undercover informant marked money,
wired him with a transmitter, and sent him to the appellant's home where he
purchased marijuana. The house was then searched pursuant to a search warrant,
and the appellant was arrested for delivery of marijuana. At the grand jury proceedings, a police officer stated that the informant was a juvenile, when he was
in fact eighteen years old. An assistant prosecutor also misstated the informant's
age, and also defined entrapment in response to a juror's question. The indictment
charged the defendant with "feloniously delivering... for renumeration, a certain
quantity of marijuana." At trial, the state called a witness who was not listed
in the state's answer to the defense's request for disclosure of witnesses. However,
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the witness's name appeared on another document filed with the court that indicated he would be a witness. The tape recording of the electronic surveillance
while the informant was in the appellant's home was played at the trial. Although
portions of the tape were inaudible, the portions relating to the sale of marijuana
were audible and intelligible. The state introduced evidence that the police had
been receiving complaints of the appellant selling drugs for some months prior
to arrest, and the informant testified that his brother had been purchasing marijuana from her for a year. The court instructed the jury that such evidence was
introduced to show the motive of the informant in working with the police. Prior
to trial, the defense moved to exclude as evidence a box of drugs and paraphenalia
that were irrelevant to the case, and the court ordered that most of these items
be excluded from evidence. The prosecution placed the box of items within view
of the jury but did not offer them as evidence. At the defense's request, the court
ordered the items moved. They were moved but remained within view of the jury.
During sentencing, the court did not permit either the appellant or her counsel
to speak in her behalf and denied her request for a probation hearing.
On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed the following issues: (1) Whether the tape of the electronic surveillance was obtained
by illegal search and seizure and therefore inadmissable; (2) whether the fact that
portions of the tape were inaudible prohibited its introduction into evidence; (3)
whether the incorrect statements of the informant's age and the prosecutor's definition of entrapment constituted an attempt to influence the grand jury's decision
by presenting unsworn testimony; (4) whether the state's failure to disclose the
name of a witness in its answer to a request for disclosure warranted a reversal;
(5) whether the trial court erred in allowing the state to introduce evidence of
previous sales of marijuana to show the motive of the informant in working with
the police; (6) whether the trial court erred in allowing the display of the irrelevant
items after ordering that they be suppressed; (7) whether the trial court was required to permit the defendant or her counsel to speak in her behalf at a sentencing
hearing; (8) whether the trial court was required to allow the defendant to present
her case for probation; (9) whether the indictment was defective because it contained the words "for remuneration" which added a pecuniary element to the
charge and improperly stated the law of West Virginia relating to the delivery of
marijuana.
The court held: (1) Even though the police had no warrant for the surveillance,
the evidence was not obtained by illegal search and seizure since the informant
had consented to having the transaction recorded and since the appellant had
been neither arrested nor indicted at the time the recording was made; (2) a
partially inaudible recording may be admitted as evidence as long as the recording
as a whole is coherent and as long as the portions relevant to the case are audible
and intelligible; (3) the incorrect statements and definition of entrapment were
made in response to questions by jurors rather than at the prosecutor's instigation
and therefore were not an attempt by the prosecutor to influence the jury's de-
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cision with unsworn evidence; (4) the defense was not prejudiced by surprise since
it had prior notice that the witness would be called to testify, and the omission
of the witness's name from the list of witnesses does not warrant reversal; (5)
the court erred in admitting evidence of collateral crimes of selling marijuana,
but the error was harmless since there was enough direct evidence to support the
verdict without the evidence of collateral crimes and since the court gave cautionary instructions limiting the prejudicial effect of the improper evidence; (6)
allowing the display of the suppressed items was within the court's discretion,
and it was not reversible error to permit the display; (7) the court is required to
permit a defendant or her counsel to speak in her behalf at a sentencing hearing
under Rule 32(a)(1) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure; (8) the
court is required to permit a defendant to present a case for probation if the
defendant meets the statutory requirements for probation, but the extent of the
testimony concerning probation is within the trial court's discretion; (9) the words
"for remuneration" were pure surplusage in the indictment, and the inclusion of
surplusage in an indictment is not a fatal defect which renders conviction upon
the indictment reversible.
STATE v. YORK, 338 S.E.2d 219 (W. Va. 1985).
Criminal Procedure-Evidence
The defendant was charged with drunk driving when he failed to pass a
breathalyzer test. He alleges that he requested a blood test as well, but the deputies
who made the arrest denied that any such request was made. The breath sample
was not preserved as evidence to be used at trial. The trial court found the defendant guilty.
On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed the following issues: (1) Whether law enforcement officers have a duty to provide a
blood test in every drunk driving case, and (2) whether breath samples must be
preserved as evidence to be introduced at trial.
The court held: (1) Under West Virginia Code section 17C-5-9, law enforcement officials are not required to provide a blood test unless the defendant requests one within two hours of arrest, and officials are not required to inform
a defendant of his right to such a test; (2) either the West Virginia Code nor
common law requires that breath samples be preserved in order to introduce the
test results as evidence.
In re VANCE, 337 S.E.2d 916 (W. Va. 1985).
Criminal Procedure-Evidence
The appelliant's mother was accused of wounding a man, and the appellant
testified at her preliminary hearing, confessing that he had wounded the victim.
The victim later died, and a delinquency petition was filed against the appellant.
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The State moved that he be transferred from juvenile to criminal jurisdiction and
introduced his confession as supporting evidence.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed whether the appellant's confession during his mother's preliminary hearing was admissable in his
hearing on the transfer motion.
The court held that the confession was inadmissible under West Virginia Code
section 57-2-3 which provides that a statement made by the accused during a legal
examination may not be used against the accused in a criminal prosecution other
than for perjury or false swearing.
PatriciaL. Rush
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